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	Director of Gentral Intelligence	27 Soptember 1960
25X1A	CTA (and State Department) Participation in	Conference

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1. As a metter of interest and for the record, I report herein the position taken by General Heges (Deputy Director for Intelligence. The Joint Staff, and Chairman of the Conference) regarding Cla and State Department participation in Conference.

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- E. General lieges took this position to counter a tendency of the Gel and Led representatives at the Conference to argue (a) that the Conference was held by direction of the Joint Chiefe of Staff to provide intelligence for thom. (b) that the provision of intelligence to the JOS was the exclusive function of the Joint Intelligence Consistes, (c) that the Service representatives at the Conference represented the unabers of the JIC, and (d) that consequently the views of a majority of the Service representatives (i.e., Gel and Led) should provail, even with respect to political questions, over those of State and Cin (supported by CEI). This argument was, of course, an attempt to convert a minority into a majority of those having an effective voice in the proceedings.
- 5. General lisens echnowledged that the Conference was being held by direction of the JIO pursuent to JOB direction, but observed that the JIC had invited the participation of State and Old on the presentation that they had a competence in relation to political and other authors beyond the competence of the Service agencies or of JW. He asserted that he alone represented the JIC or its several members at the Conserence, the position of the Bervice representatives being that of working-level advisors to him. He did not hold the same authority over the representatives of State and CIA, but must accept their considered judgments on mutters within their primary countsmos on the assumption that they spoke with the authority of their respective againsts in such emitters. He would expect them to give due consideration to any opinions offered by Service representatives, but, in the event of on unrecolved difference, he would rule, in the name of JIC, in favor of the State-Cla position. Any of those rulings which a meshor of the JIO sow fit to question could, of course, be taken up when the optimute was before JIC for review, after the adjournmont of the Conference.
 - 4. In accordance with this doctrine General Megoe actually

DIA AND JCS REVIEW COMPLETED

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rejected several G-2 and A-2 contentions on political matters which were unacceptable to State and GIA. In particular, the motorious Air Force thosis regarding Seviet dectrine and policy, based on a specious pretension to scholarly competence in that political field, was thus rejected. This situation was of special interest in that, whereas we have had to endure immunorable Air Force discents on political issues, this is the first time that the Air Force thesis which underlay them has been exposed to State and GIA acceptance or rejection. The occasion embled me to acceptable what I had sought in win in relation to GES 91-49 and GES 58-50, the clear alignment of State and OHI with GIA in rejecting this Air Force political thesis.

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political factors in strategic situations. Insemuch as political factors in strategic situations. Insemuch as political factors are revely negligible, even in Joint Staff estimates, this condition encourages the Service Agencies to continue to make jackles political estimates which the more readily find exceptance in the Partagen because they are not subjected to competent criticism. Indeed, consultation with State or CIA is often		÷
deliberately evoided to known or supposed that the Service political estimate would not survive their criticism, and that an estimate in which they could concur would not support the policy the Service estimate was designed to promote. General Megeo's attitude served to rectly this situation with respect to Conference. It remains a continuing problem, however, with respect to the normal operations of the JIC and JIC.	25X1	25X1
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